Abstract: Frederick Engels's Anti-Dühring was the most important theoretical response to the emerging reformist tendencies within European socialism in the nineteenth century. It also proved to be Engels's most influential, and controversial work. Because it is, as Hal Draper points out, "the only more or less systematic presentation of Marxism" by either by Marx or Engels, anyone wanting to reinterpret Marx must first detach it from his seal of approval. It is thus around Anti-Dühring and related texts that debates about the relationship of Marx to "Engelsian" Marxism have tended to focus. This essay re-engages with debates about Engels's mature work with a view to unpicking his contribution to Marxism from caricatured criticisms of his thought.
Thus, contra Dühring, Engels suggested that "to a make a science of socialism, it had first to be placed upon a real basis". 25 If this had happened with the emergence of the modern working class, from this moment onwards socialism had been transformed from an abstract and empty ideal into a concrete historical possibility. Engels's socialism was thus a novel, emergent force with a corresponding emergent value system. So, whereas Dühring claimed that morality stands as a "special … absolutely immutable … truth … above history", 26 Engels countered that though some eternal truths did exist, these were few and far between and usually took the form of platitudes. He distinguished between three levels of scientific enterprise: the study of inanimate objects, the study of living organisms, and the study of human history. If exact, universal truths are most likely to occur in the first group, in reality because the sciences relating to these areas are replete with competing hypotheses such truths are "remarkably rare".
The situation with the regards the second group is even less certain, while, in the third group where "repetition of condition is the exception and not the rule", knowledge becomes "essentially relative". Consequently, it is close to impossible to talk of "immutable truths" in respect of human societies. 27 And the contested nature of the human sciences were magnified when applied to the study of ethics.
28
Though Engels believed that the profound historical variation of morality should consign the idea of transhistorical moral truths to the dustbin of history, this did not entail that he embraced a form of nihilism. In fact, the opposite is the case: this insight actually underpinned his value system. His rejection of the idea of timeless moral precepts informed the questions he posed of contemporary morality. Which moral standpoint at the present juncture, he asked, "contains the maximum elements promising permanence which, in the present, represents the overthrow of the present, represents the future"? His answer was "proletarian morality", or the system of values congruent with the struggle of the modern working class for freedom against alienation.
29
Clearly, Engels's conception of proletarian morality is rooted in sectional concerns that emerged as a historical phenomenon alongside and in opposition to modern capitalism.
Nevertheless, it is not a mere sectional interest: by creating a world system of universal interconnection capitalism created for the first time the basis for a universal interest.
Meanwhile workers' struggles against alienation had emerged as the practical means to realise this universal human interest. Engels provides a useful historical sketch of the roots of this conflict. In medieval society both production and appropriation were individualised and local.
This parochial moment in history meant that the idea of a universal human interest was simply meaningless. With the development of capitalism, however, production became ever more interconnected and concentrated. But if capitalism had thus transformed production from an individual to a social system, appropriation remained privatised. Thus on top of the structural antagonism between capitalists and workers, there existed an antagonism between social production and individual appropriation. The intertwining of these contradictions suggested that the coming "proletarian revolution" simultaneously represented a sectional class conflict against capital and a struggle for the general interest against capitalist alienation: "this act of universal emancipation is the historical mission of the modern proletariat".
30
Proletarian morality is therefore an emergent property within history intimately linked to a specific group that, nevertheless, represents, for the first time in history, a real movement for the general human interest. Engels defended this proposition through a concrete application of what he called the "dialectical method used by Marx". 31 Indeed, Anti-Dühring is, amongst many other things, a powerful defence of this method. Engels felt he had to make such a defence to counter the seeming power of Dühring's analytical argument from first principles to transhistorical conclusions.
32
By contrast with this method, Engels argued that although modern science from the middle of the fifteenth century onwards marked a profound breakthrough in knowledge, it did so at a cost: the analytical method of dissecting problems into their constituent parts informed a strong tendency for modern science to study these parts in isolation. This assumption is problematic because it is impossible to comprehend real movement except at the level of conceptual wholes. Conversely, the study of isolated parts, even when brought into relation with each other, lends itself to a "narrow, metaphysical mode of thought". 33 Engels borrowed the term "metaphysical" from Hegel, and like him used it in a disparaging way to describe the one-sidedly abstract and static conceptions of reality associated especially with classical empiricism. 34 Whatever their undoubted strengths, the metaphysicians tended to squeeze real motion and qualitative change out of their image of reality: and by recombining constituent parts as externally related monads, the metaphysicians remained trapped in a narrow empiricist conception of causality. 35 If this approach more-or-less fitted with the cutting edge of scientific progress in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its limits became increasingly apparent in light of further scientific advances in the nineteenth century.
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection was merely the most important of a series of scientific discoveries that pointed in the direction of dialectical thinking. According to Engels, Darwin "dealt the metaphysical conception of nature the heaviest blow" because he showed in practice that a real scientific understanding of nature is impossible without a conception of the mediated and contradictory essence of wholes. Engels thus suggested that Thus the development of humanity's productive powers underpinned the development of human freedom:
"Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development. The first men who separated themselves from the animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom".
86
And while Engels's use of the language of "control" to describe humanity's relationship with nature might suggest a promethean tendency in his thought, he simultaneously insisted that humanity's relationship to nature should be understood dialectically. We relate to nature not externally as a power over it, but dialectically through a unity (not identity) of the natural and social realms. This meant that he was very much alive to the ecological limits of human activity.
Indeed, his comments on the unintended consequences of earlier attempts to master nature have a very modern ring to them.
87
"Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature … at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature-but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly".
88
Far from signalling a retreat from the praxis theory of the 1840s to a fatalistic reduction of human history to natural history, 89 Engels's discussion of the relation of freedom to necessity is best understood as a powerful attempt to locate human agency within nature without (1871), had argued that the decisive moment in the evolution of humanity occurred with the development of large brains, Engels suggests that massive brain development followed upon the evolution of an upright gait. 93 Once the hands of our ape ancestors were no longer primarily used to climb, evolutionary advantage moved to favour hands that could work tools. From then onwards it was only a matter of time before our ancestors' hands evolved into something resembling those of the modern humans. This fact is of terrific importance because it shows that "the hand is not only the organ of labour, it is also the product of labour".
94
This evolutionary adaptation had profound cultural and biological consequences for the further evolution of humanity. Engels argues that labour reinforced existing tendencies towards the evolution of social behaviour, up to and including the adaptation of the larynx, facilitating the development of language. Finally, labour and language together became the two most important stimuli of rapid brain expansion. 95 Increased intelligence and technological know-
